

Introduction

- Samba is a widely-used networking protocol that allows computers on a local-area network to send and receive files with each other.
- Our study aims to determine if the Samba protocol is secure for file transfer on an infrastructure network.
- Our study also aims to fabricate packets similar to legitimate packets sent to a Samba server, and “trick” the server into receiving our illegitimate packets.
- Inter-process communications, or IPCs, often take place between system processes during a file transfer. Our study aims to evaluate the extent to which these communications are secure.
- macOS creates separate system user accounts for disparate system processes. This enhances the security of file transfers.
- Windows uses a more traditional pipe system for inter-process communications. This may make the system easier to exploit.

Method

Packet capture utilities such as Wireshark and IO Monitor were used to isolate packets being transferred.




Figure B. Unencrypted data being transferred from the Mac to the Time Capsule (sniffed by Wireshark).





Figure C. Details of the testbed.

Objectives


We aim to discover a way to infiltrate a Samba server and insert data of our choosing without knowing the authentication data of the server, such as a username or password. We also aim to understand the inter-process communication involved when a Samba file transfer takes place (such as pipes used in Windows to carry out a file transfer), which can then be exploited to transport malware.



Pipe Name	Instances	Max Instances
InitShutdown	3	-1
lsass	4	-1
ntsvcs	3	-1
lschelp	3	-1
Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-26c-0	1	1
spooler	3	-1
Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-1a0-0	1	1
LSM_API_service	3	-1
eventlog	3	-1
Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-344-0	1	1
ntsvcs	3	-1
Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-3c0-0	1	1
spoolss	3	-1
Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-450-0	1	1
akservc	4	-1
erkraks	3	-1
srsvcs	4	-1
Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-1e8-0	1	1
Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-1f0-0	1	1
lsFteWds	4	-1
TDLN-2928-41	1	2
TDLN-2448-41	1	2
VBoxTrayIPC-REUstudent	1	-1

Figure A. The pipes that are open during a Samba file transfer on Windows 10.

Results



Key:
→ Data is unencrypted and vulnerable to a sniffing attack.
→ It is unknown whether data is encrypted. Packet captures do not include the data being transferred.

Figure E. The process by which data is transferred through Samba on a Windows machine. Note that regardless of the method of data transfer, or whether the transfer takes place from the client to the server or the server to the client, there exists at least one point where a sniffing attack would be successful.




Figure D. macOS uses the principle of least privilege to assign processes to system-created accounts.

Transferring data through Samba on macOS is more secure than on Windows, as macOS creates separate user accounts which isolate the processes responsible for a given task (such as file transfer). Even with root access to the system, these processes cannot be sniffed.

Conclusions and Future Work

- Samba is an inherently insecure protocol vulnerable to sniffing attacks, which can procure useable data through packet carving¹.
- Any implementation of Samba must only carry data that is already encrypted by the client before being sent.
- In some operating systems such as Windows, inter-process communications can be intercepted as well.

Further work will focus on exploiting the unencrypted Windows pipe data transfer in order to send illegitimate data through the pipe, and thus to the server.

References

- Richard R, et. al. “Packet Carving with SMB and SMB2: Chris Sanders.” *Chris Sanders | Information Security Analyst, Author, and Instructor*, 17 Dec. 2011, chrisanders.org/2011/11/packet-carving-with-smb-and-smb2/.
- Gegick, Michael et. al. “Least Privilege.” *US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team*, 14 Sept. 2005, us-cert.cisa.gov/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege.



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